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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Weston Nelson appeals from the district court's Judgment of Dismissal granting 
the State's motion for summary dismissal. Mr. Nelson that the district court 
erred in summarily dismissing his claim that his guilty plea was induced by his trial 
counsel's false promise that he would be accepted into a problem solving court. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Nelson pied guilty to burglary and was sentenced to a unified term of 10 
with 6 . (R., pp.14-1 ) He filed a timely Petition for Conviction 
Relief along with an Affidavit of Facts in Support of Post-Conviction Petition. (R., pp.11-
17.) Mr. Nelson generally claimed that his counsel was ineffective, that his plea was not 
knowing or voluntary because it was induced by promises that were not kept, and that 
his sentence was disproportionate to the crime he pied guilty to. (R., p.15.) In one of 
his claims, Mr. Nelson asserted that he received ineffective assistance of counsel as his 
counsel, "Told me I would qualify for a problem-solving court, which she was a member 
of the board of, knowing that I was a Utah resident with no local ties." (R., p.16.) In his 
affidavit, Mr. Nelson expanded on this claim asserting, 
Ms. Campbell advised me to plead guilty as charged with the intent of 
entering a problem solving court. (Drug court or Wood pilot). 
Ms. Campbell was a member of the board that approves or denies 
applicants and she told me that I met the qualifications. On her advise 
(sic), I plead guilty and applied to the problem-solving courts and was 
immediately denied because I am resident of Utah and "have no local ties 
and support to do the programs." This is information Ms. Campbell had 
prior to giving me the faulty advice. 
1 
, p.11.) The district court granted Mr. Nelson's request for appointment of 
(R., pp.18-21, 31.) 
The State filed an Answer, a Motion for Summary Disposition, and a Brief in 
Support of Summary Disposition arguing, generally, that the district court should 
summarily dismiss Mr. Nelson's petition. (R., pp.33-36, 42-54.) Along with its other 
arguments, the State asserted that "[i]n order for a claim to be raised in a post-
conviction proceeding, it must be raise on direct appeal or, a Petitioner must 
demonstrate why the claim was not raised on direct appeal." (R., p.50.) Based upon 
this analysis, the State asserted that the only that could be raised in this 
raised and denied on appeal. (R., p.50.) 
The court held a hearing on the State's motion for summary dismissal, during 
which counsel for Mr. Nelson appeared to undermine all of Mr. Nelson's claims with the 
exception of one. 1 (Tr., p.3, L.14 - p.7, L.6.) Regarding Mr. Nelson's claim that his trial 
counsel falsely told him he would be eligible for a problem-solving court despite knowing 
that he was a resident of Utah, trial counsel stated the following: 
In 1 (B), he indicates "She advised me to plead guilty with the intent 
of entering a problem-solving court." He did apply for the problem-solving 
courts, and he was turned down from Drug Court. He was turned down 
from Wood Pilot Court. And he was also turned down for Mental Health 
Court. So I don't see that his ineffective assistance of counsel claim is 
supportedin(B)elthe~ 
1 Mr. Nelson had asserted that the State breached the terms of the plea agreement by 
recommending the maximum sentence arguing that the plea agreement required the 
State not to exceed the recommendation of the PSI writer, which was merely a 
recommendation of incarceration. (R., p.11.) Counsel for Mr. Nelson requested an 
evidentiary hearing on that issue. (Tr., p.5, L.4 - p.7, L.6.) Mr. Nelson does not assert 
the district court erred in summarily dismissing this claim. 
2 
Ls.9-16.) The district court granted the State's motion for summary dismissal, 
addressing Mr. Nelson's claim that his trial induced him to 
plead guilty under the false promise that he would be admitted to a problem-solving 
court knowing that he was a resident of Utah. However, the district court stated, 
I will also comment that there had been an appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Idaho in this particular matter. And many issues, as you pointed 
out in your brief, [Mr. Prosecutor], were raised, but none of them were 
raised that were raised in the petition and could have been raised in this 
particular matter. And, therefore, on that basis, I'm going to deny the 
petition for post-conviction relief. 
(Tr., p.9, Ls.16-24.) Mr. Nelson filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.2-5, 57-60, 65-
3 
ISSUE 
Did the court err in granting the State's motion for summary dismissal of 
Mr. Nelson's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective, and his plea was not knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily entered into, based upon counsel falsely advising 




The District Court Erred In Granting The State's Motion For Summary Dismissal Of 
Mr. Nelson's Claim That His Trial Counsel Was Ineffective, And His Plea Was Not 
Knowingly, Intelligently, And Voluntarily Entered Into, Based Upon Counsel Falsely 
Advising Mr. Nelson That He Was Eligible For A Problem-Solving Court, While Knowing 
That He Was Not 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Nelson averred in his affidavit in support of his post-conviction petition that 
his trial counsel told him that she was on the board that determined whether individuals 
are eligible for a problem-solving court and that he would be eligible, knowing that 
Mr. Nelson was not eligible because he was a resident of Utah. The State did not bring 
forth to controvert this factual assertion. Therefore, there exists a genuine 
issue of material fact as to this issue and the district court erred in summarily dismissing 
this issue. 
B. Standards Of Review 
A post-conviction petition initiates a proceeding that is civil in nature and, like a 
plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant must prove his or her allegations upon which the 
requests for relief are based by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Yakovac, 
145 Idaho 437, 443 (2008). However, unlike a plaintiff in other civil cases, the original 
post-conviction petition must allege more than merely "a short and plain statement of 
the claim." Id. at 443-444. The application must present or be accompanied by 
admissible evidence supporting the allegations contained therein, or else the post-
conviction petition may be subject to dismissal. Id. In addition, the post-conviction 
petition must set forth with specificity the legal grounds upon which the application is 
based. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675 (2010). 
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A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly brought through 
post-conviction proceedings. Thomas v. 1 Idaho 765, 769, 1 P.3d 1, 
(Ct. App. 2008). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner 
must first show that trial counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 687 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 
760 ( 1988 ). Where a defendant shows that his counsel was deficient, prejudice is 
shown if there is a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, at 694; Aragon at 
760. Where a petitioner claims that his guilty plea was induced by the erroneous advice 
of counsel, petitioner must demonstrate that, but for counsel's erroneous advice, the 
petitioner would not have entered into the plea agreement. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 
59-60 (1985). 
A district court may summarily dismiss a post-conviction petition only where the 
petition and evidence supporting the petition fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact 
that, if resolved in the petitioner's favor, would entitle him or her to the relief requested. 
Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444. "A material fact has 'some logical connection with the 
consequential facts[,]' Black's Law Dictionary, 991 (7th Ed.1999), and therefore is 
determined by its relationship to the legal theories presented by the parties." Id. On 
review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary 
hearing, the appellate court must determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists 
based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file. 
Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894, 896 (Ct. App. 1993). 
6 
The United States Supreme Court has defined the standard for whether there 
a genuine issue of material fact as whether "the evidence is such that a 
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). "The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry 
of determining whether there is the need for a trial whether, in other words, there are 
any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved in favor of either party." Id. at 
250. If a genuine factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. 
Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444. The underlying facts alleged by the petitioner "must be 
regarded as true" for purposes of summary dismissal. Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 
247, 250 (2009). Any disputed facts are construed in favor the non-moving party, 
and "all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are drawn in favor of 
the non-moving party." Vavold v. State, 148 Idaho 44, 45 (2009). 
C. There Was A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact As To Whether Mr. Nelson's Trial 
Counsel Falsely Advised Him That He Would Be Accepted Into A Problem 
Solving Court 
Mr. Nelson swore in his affidavit in support of his petition for post-conviction relief 
that his trial counsel told him that she was on the board that decides who is eligible for a 
problem-solving court, and that she told him that he was eligible despite knowing that he 
was a resident of Utah and, thus, was not eligible to participate in a problem-solving 
court. (R., p.11.) Mr. Nelson further swore that he pied guilty based upon this false 
advice, and he applied for problem-solving courts only to find that he was not eligible 
because of his residency, of which trial counsel was aware prior to his entering his plea. 
(R., p.11.) As such, he has provided evidence which, if proven by a preponderance of 
7 
the evidence, entitles him to post-conviction Hill V. 474 U . 
59-60 (1985). 
The State presented no evidence to the contrary. Mr. Nelson's counsel's failure 
to recognize the validity of this claim does not relieve the district court of its duty to 
determine whether there was a genuine issue of material fact which, if found in 
Mr. Nelson's favor, would entitle him to relief. Therefore, this Court should find that the 
district court erroneously granted the State's motion for summary dismissal of this issue, 
and should remand the case to the district court with instructions that an evidentiary 
hearing be held. 
D. Mr. Nelson's Failure To Assert That His Guilty Plea Was Induced By His Trial 
Counsel's False Promise On His Direct Appeal, Does Not Preclude Him From 
Raising This Issue In Post-Conviction 
In its Brief in Support of Summary Dismissal, the State made the claim that "In 
order for a claim to be raised in a post-conviction proceeding, it must be raise on direct 
appeal or, a Petitioner must demonstrate why the claim was not raised on direct 
appeal." (R., p.50.) The district court appears to have agreed with this proposition and 
stated that it was denying Mr. Nelson's post-conviction petition on this basis. (Tr., p.9, 
Ls.16-24.) Both the State and the district court are wrong. 
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be raised either in a direct appeal 
or in a post-conviction, but not both. Parrott v. State, 117 Idaho 272 (1990). The fact 
that Mr. Nelson did not raise his ineffective assistance of counsel claims in his direct 
appeal does not preclude him from raising these claims in his petition for post-conviction 
relief. In fact, the opposite is true. Mr. Nelson's decision not to raise any ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims in his direct appeal was a prerequisite to him being able to 
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raise these claims in his post-conviction. Thus, the district court's denial of Mr. Nelson's 
claim on this basis is erroneous. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Nelson respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's 
summary dismissal of his claim that his plea was induced by a false promise made by 
his trial counsel, and remand this case for an evidentiary hearing. 
DATED this 6th day of May, 2014. 
JASJtJ . 
D~/uty State Appellate Public Defender 
V 
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